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PGV Response to the Element II Executive Summary. 
Based upon Puna Geothermal Venture's (PGV)'s own internal review of the 
information available regarding the emergency response to the KS-8 uncontrolled flow 
event and its consequences, and the actions taken by all parties during the emergency, 
PGV believes that its approved Emergency Response Plan (ERP), specifically 
Section 8.2. 1. of the PGV ERP, adequately anticipated the possible occurrence of 
such an uncontrolled flow event. The PGV ERP provided PGV, emergency response 
personnel and the public with generally accurate information regarding the possible 
consequences of such an event. PGV concurs with the principal finding of the 
Element II Report that "The actual implementation of the PGV Emergency Response 
Plan (ERP) went reasonably well." 
PGV also agrees with the Element II Report that there appears to have been some 
confusion on the part of emergency response personnel and the public during and 
after the uncontrolled flow event regarding how to proceed, the applicability of the 
temporary housing cost reimbursement, and the PGV employee alarm system. This 
apparent public and agency confusion regarding the emergency episode underscores 
the need tor the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency (HCD), other government 
agencies, and PGV to work harder to educate the community regarding the PGV 
ERP. PGV believes that everyone involved must recognize that the PGV ERP is not 
designed to direct the response actions of either the agencies or the communities in 
the event of any emergency at the PGV facility. This is the responsibility of the 
HCD and the HCD's emergency implementation plan. Accordingly, PGV believes it 
also necessary that the public and other government agencies be educated concerning 
the HCD's implementation plan for any emergency which may arise on the PGV 
facility site (see PGV Responses Nand 0). 
PGV generally concurs with the recommendations of the Element II Report, and has 
cooperated and will continue to fully cooperate with representatives of the Hawaii 
State Department of Health, Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission, and the 
Hawaii County Local Emergency Response Commission in these matters (see PGV 
Responses V through AA). PGV concurs with the recommendation that the Hawaii 
State Department of Health (DOH) conduct a review of the "action levels" for 
hydrogen sulfide, although PGV believes that the "action levels" already proposed by 
DOH are appropriate and should be accepted as the "action levels" for hydrogen 
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sulfide (see PGV Responses J and N). PGV also generally agrees with the intent of 
the recommendation to review the PGV ERP, since the PGV ERP provides that it 
"will be updated as appropriate when necessary" (see PGV Responses M and 0). 
A. Page 2, paragraph 1, time of the uncontrolled flow event. 
Please see PGV Response C. 
B. Page 2, paragraph 3, employee alarm system. 
PGV concurs that the employee alarm system located at the PGV project facility was 
not intended to alert nearby residents of any emergency situation requiring their 
evacuation. This is made very clear in Section 5.1 (discussing the alarm horn's use 
for on-site warning of PGV personnel) and Section 5.2 (which states that warning to 
residents will be provided by the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency (HCD)) of 
PGV's Emergency Response Plan (ERP). However, the public confusion underscores 
the need for the HCD, other government agencies, and PGV to work harder to 
educate the community regarding the PGV ERP, and especially the HCD's 
implementation plan for any emergency which may arise on the PGV facility site. 
See also PGV Responses Nand 0. 
C. Page 3, Wednesday, 12 June 1991, first point regarding time of the uncontrolled flow 
event. 
The uncontrolled flow event did not occur at 23:06 on June 12, 1991. According to 
the records of the on-site mudlogger, the uncontrolled flow event occurred at 23:16 
(as shown on the mudlogger's clock) on Wednesday, June 12, 1991 (see also page 8 
of the Element I Report). Based upon a subsequent review of the mudlogger's clock 
and a comparison to the correct time, the actual time for the initiation of the 
uncontrolled flow event would be 23: 19. These times have also been confirmed with 
other individuals who were on-site at the time of the uncontrolled flow event. Based 
on the log of the event prepared by HCD, PGV first reported the uncontrolled flow 
event to the Hawaii Police Department (HPD) at 23:20, although the actual time of 
the first report may have been as late as 23:25. This means that from one (1) to nine 
(9) minutes elapsed between the initiation of the uncontrolled flow event and the 
initial notification of the event by PGV to the HPD. 
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D. Page 3, Wednesday, 13 June 1991, first point regarding PGV recommendation for 
evacuation. 
HCD logs indicate that PGV's recommendation to commence evacuation of Lanipuna 
Gardens was made to Hawaii HPD at 00:35 on Thursday, 13 June, 1991, not 00:10. 
E. Page 3, Wednesday, 13 June 1991, fourth point regarding initial PGV monitoring 
data. 
PGV concurs that the initial monitoring of off-site ambient hydrogen sulfide 
concentrations by PGV at 01:00 indicated concentrations of 22 and 29 parts per 
million (ppm}. (But see discussion below.) Once these levels were measured, PGV 
immediately reported the values to HCD without attempting to gather any more data, 
since these two readings were relatively high and reinforced the earlier decision to 
evacuate the residents of Lanipuna Gardens. 
However, because the subsequent off-site measurements of ambient hydrogen sulfide 
concentrations taken either through spot checks or measured by the fixed monitoring 
stations during the event were all 40 times less than these original measurements, 
PGV recently investigated in detail the validity of these readings. Based upon 
conversations with the PGV staff involved in taking the readings and communications 
with the manufacturer of the monitoring instrument, PGV now believes that these two 
initial off-site ambient hydrogen sulfide concentration readings were in error (see 
Attachment 1). 
During the uncontrolled flow event, all parties acted responsibly in assuming that 
these initial hydrogen sulfide readings were accurate; to do otherwise during an 
emergency situation would not be prudent. However, PGV now believes sufficient 
information is available to document that the highest measured instantaneous ambient 
hydrogen sulfide concentration recorded during the uncontrolled flow event was 
approximately 0.5 parts per million (ppm) [500 parts per billion (ppb)], not the 20 to 
29 ppm (20,000 to 29,000 ppb} previously reported. The validity of these initial high 
values has not been supported by any of the modeling subsequently conducted as a 
part of the review of the uncontrolled flow event by the state's review panel (see PGV 
Response G to the Element 111-11 Report}. 
F. Page 3, Wednesday, 13 June 1991, fifth point regarding DOH-recommended 
hydrogen sulfide action level. 
The 10 ppm (10,000 ppb} one hour average ambient hydrogen sulfide level 
recommended by the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) as the level at which 
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residents should be relocated is the same value recommended by DOH in its letter of 
June 7, 1990 commenting on its review of Version 2 (dated April 12, 1990) of the 
PGV ERP before it was approved by HCD. The 100 ppb (0.1 ppm) one hour 
average "alert", 1.00 ppm (1 ,000 ppb) one hour average "warning" , and the 
10.0 ppm (10,000 ppb) one hour average "emergency" "action levels" recommended 
by DOH at that time (see Attachment 2 and PGV Response N) were subsequently 
incorporated into Version 3 of PGV's ERP, which was submitted to the HCD on 
July 2, 1990 (see Attachment 3). The DOH, in their letter of June 17 [sic], 1990 (see 
Attachment 4) accepted PGV's Version 3 of the ERP, stating that the ERP would 
provide "an excellent reference for state and county agencies to use for emergency 
planning purposes as they relate to the PGV facility." However, HCD rejected 
Version 3 of the ERP, and required that PGV remove from the ERP any reference to 
specific "action levels" for hydrogen sulfide. Accordingly, the current approved 
version of the ERP, Version 5, does not present any recommendations regarding 
ambient hydrogen sulfide "action levels". 
G. Page 4, first paragraph under Release Notification regarding time of the uncontrolled 
flow event. 
As discussed above in PGV Response C, because the correct time for the 
commencement of the uncontrolled flow event was either 23:16 (as shown on the 
mudlogger's clock) or 23:19, and PGV notified the HPD at either 23:20 or 23:25 , the 
actual time between the initiation of the uncontrolled flow event and notification to the 
authorities was between one (1) and nine (9) minutes, not the nineteen (19) minutes 
presented in the Element II Report. 
H. Page 5, paragraph 1, notification of release of reportable quantity. 
PGV reported the event to the National Response Center on July 30, 1991. Written 
follow up notification to the State Emergency Response Commission of the hydrogen 
sulfide release was submitted on August 1, 1991. 
I. Page 5, paragraph 1 under Site Response by PGV. 
The Element II Report correctly notes that in order to control the well, it was 
necessary to divert as much of the geothermal steam as possible away from the rig 
floor in order to initiate control activities. As a result, PGV opened the four-inch 
choke line and allowed steam to flow through the line, to be discharged horizontally 
over the on-site mud pit. Discharge of geothermal steam or fluid through the 
horizontal choke line was never considered as a "normal" or "upset" operation under 
any of the permits, nor was it specifically considered as an emergency event under the 
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PGV ERP, principally because such a discharge was never considered as a likely 
emergency occurrence. Based upon PGV's review of the mechanical aspects of the 
uncontrolled flow event, PGV has now redesigned the blowout prevention equipment 
stack and wellhead to provide multiple pathways for controlling any unexpected flows 
of drilling muds or geothermal fluids, and has provided mechanisms to abate the 
hydrogen sulfide that may be contained in the flow through each pathway. For 
further information regarding the changes to wellhead equipment and flow 
control/hydrogen sulfide treatment, see Attachment 1 to PGV's Response to the 
Element I Report. 
J. Page 5, paragraph 3 under Site Response by PGV 
PGV is unaware of any significant potential for contamination of personal protection 
equipment as a result of exposure to the hydrogen sulfide concentrations contained in 
the geothermal fluid or steam. Only at extremely high concentrations of hydrogen 
sulfide can "contamination" occur, and then the only "decontamination" required is to 
air out the "contaminated" materials. PGV has previously offered to assist emergency 
response personnel in receiving training regarding hydrogen sulfide, an offer which 
some members of the Hawaii County Fire Department (HFD) have already accepted. 
In addition, PGV previously assured the HFD that PGV would always have at least 
two (2) self-contained breathing units available to the HFD if they needed them. 
PGV believes that such training and equipment may still be beneficial to the 
emergency response personnel, and again offers to provide appropriate assistance. 
K. Page 6, paragraph 2 under Public Alert Notification and Evacuation regarding the 
high hydrogen sulfide concentrations. 
While PGV believes that the ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations "may have 
declined rapidly after the initial release," the initially reported high hydrogen sulfide 
concentrations (22 and 29 ppm) have now been determined to be incorrect (see 
discussion above in PGV Response E). PGV believes that the 0.5 ppm (500 ppb) 
concentration of hydrogen sulfide measured by DOH at 01:25 on June 13, 1991, on 
Lanipuna Street was actually a more accurate number. 
L. Page 6, paragraph 3 under Public Alert Notification and Evacuation regarding 
notifications given to residents. 
PGV has received comments from a number of residents of the community, 
principally through the relocation compensation forms submitted to PGV, which 
indicate that some of the residents also were confused regarding the directions they 
were receiving from the emergency response personnel. Many residents, in fact, 
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believed that the emergency response personnel providing the notification were 
suggesting evacuation. As such, it may be that some of the notifications given to the 
residents were not completely clear. 
M. Page 7, paragraph 4 under Emergency Air Quality Monitoring regarding taking 
ambient air hydrogen sulfide samples from the community. 
Between the time of the initiation of the uncontrolled flow event and the time that the 
initial community monitoring results were collected, all available PGV staff who were 
trained in the use of the Jerome monitoring equipment were involved on-site in the 
evacuation of personnel and the stabilization of the well. As a result of the 
knowledge gained from the uncontrolled flow event, PGV has initiated a program of 
training more project personnel in the basic use of the Jerome monitoring unit, and 
has purchased a second Jerome monitoring unit for use by the project and agency 
staff. 
At the time PGV purchased its first Jerome monitoring unit, both the HCD and DOH 
were offered the opportunity to purchase one or more identical units, with the 
objective of reducing the cost per unit. However, neither agency was able to locate 
the funds sufficient to participate in such a group purchase. PGV believes it may be 
appropriate, whether or not any other agencies purchase a similar monitoring unit, for 
appropriate agency staff who may be responding to a possible future uncontrolled 
flow event be trained in the use of the Jerome monitoring units. On-site monitoring 
of hydrogen sulfide emissions, combined with the on-site hydrogen sulfide alarms 
designed to protect workers' safety, should eliminate the need for community-wide 
monitoring by an alarm-type monitor. In addition, implementation of the 
recommendations contained in the Element III Reports regarding a reconfiguration and 
integration of the ambient air hydrogen sulfide monitoring network will provide for 
the opportunity to determine community hydrogen sulfide concentrations during a 
possible future uncontrolled flow event, should one occur. 
N. Page 8, paragraph 2 under Adequacy of Action Levels. 
See PGV Response F. The "action levels" recommended by the DOH in its letter of 
June 27, 1990 (see Attachment 2) contains "alert", "warning", and "emergency" 
levels. It is clear from the levels of ambient hydrogen sulfide measured off-site 
during the uncontrolled flow event that the DOH-recommended "alert" level of 
100 ppb (0.1 ppm) over a one-hour averaging period was exceeded, and there is some 
possibility that the recommended "warning" level of 1.00 ppm (1,000 ppb) over a 
one-hour averaging period may have been exceeded. However, based on all currently 
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available data, it is clear that the DOH-recommended "emergency" level of 10.0 ppm 
(10,000 ppb) over a one-hour averaging period was not exceeded. 
PGV recommends that the "action levels" originally recommended by DOH and 
incorporated by PGV into Version 3 (see Attachment 3) of the PGV ERP (but 
subsequently removed at the request of HCD) be accepted as the appropriate "action 
levels" for hydrogen sulfide, and information regarding these levels, the possible 
effects which individuals may experience as a result of these levels, and the 
appropriate actions to be taken by the public, emergency response personnel, and 
PGV, be disseminated widely to both the public and emergency response personnel. 
PGV believes that if this information had been accepted and more widely distributed 
at the time of the event, confusion over the emergency situation would not have been 
as great. 
0. Page 8, paragraph under Community Relations and Emergency Preparedness. 
PGV agrees that there appears to have been some confusion on the part of both 
emergency response personnel and the public during the uncontrolled flow event. 
PGV also concurs with the Element II Report that minimizing such confusion, through 
increased communication among PGV, the community and regulatory agencies, is 
always beneficial. See also PGV Response N. 
However, PGV believes that it has never been the objective of the PGV ERP to direct 
the response actions of either the agencies or the communities in the event of any 
emergency at the PGV facility. The PGV ERP is specifically designed to provide 
"the basis of all actions by PGV's personnel and management staff in responding to 
[emergency] situations," and the HCD, and other government agencies, have always 
made it clear that the PGV ERP would be used by these agencies to prepare agency 
emergency response implementation plans which would be relied upon by the agencies 
in the case of an emergency. PGV concurs with the primary observation of the 
Element II Report that "the actual implementation of the PGV emergency response 
plan went reasonably well." PGV has, and will continue to be, willing to work with 
the HCD and other government agencies to ensure that all parties involved understand 
what may be expected of them in an emergency. 
P. Page 9, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 regarding modeled and measured hydrogen sulfide 
concentrations. 
PGV agrees that spot measurements of ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations taken 
throughout the community were within the ranges of modeled or predicted hydrogen 
sulfide values estimated in the PGV ERP. However, it must be recognized that the 
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modeled values are for one-hour averages, whereas the spot measurements are 
instantaneous readings, which may be two, three or more times the hourly averages. 
In addition, EPA-approved air dispersion models are typically very conservative, and 
thus substantially over-estimate actual pollutant concentrations under modeled 
circumstances, especially short-term (such as one-hour) concentrations. 
PGV agrees that spot monitoring measurements may not be taken at the actual point 
of highest concentration, thus necessitating building-in a safety factor; however, such 
a safety factor is already built-in since spot measurements overestimate the one-hour 
averages, which are the numbers used to determine the hydrogen sulfide "action 
levels". PGV believes also that additional analysis of the available air monitoring 
data may help to better verify the actual atmospheric concentrations experienced 
during the uncontrolled flow event. See PGV Responses F and G to the 
Element III-II Report and PGV Response E. 
Q. Page 9, paragraph 4, regarding additional hazard analyses. 
See PGV Response I. 
R. Page 9, paragraph 5, regarding ambient hydrogen sulfide monitoring capabilities. 
See PGV Response M. 
S. Page 9, paragraph 6, regarding controlling upset conditions. 
See PGV Response I. 
T. Page 9, paragraph 6, regarding reporting requirements. 
See PGV Response N. 
U. Page 10, paragraph 3, regarding DOH hydrogen sulfide "action" levels. 
See PGV Response N. 
V. Page 11, Recommendation A, revised hazard analyses. 
PGV generally concurs with this recommendation, and has cooperated and will 
continue to fully cooperate with representatives of the Hawaii State Department of 
Health, Hawaii State Emergency Response Commission, and the Hawaii County Local 
Emergency Response Commission in this matter. 
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W. Page 11, Recommendation B, review of "action" levels. 
PGV also concurs with this recommendation, although we believe that the "action 
levels" already proposed by DOH are appropriate. See also PGV Responses J and N. 
X. Page 11, Recommendation C, review of hydrogen sulfide monitoring capability. 
PGV concurs with the recommendation. See specifically PGV Responses M and 0. 
Y. Page 11, Recommendation D, review and revision of PGV ERP. 
PGV generally concurs with the intent of this recommendation since the PGV ERP 
provides that it "will be updated as appropriate when necessary." PGV ERP, p. 1 of 
Chapter 1. In addition, see specifically PGV Responses M and 0. 
Z. Page 12, Recommendation E, community confusion regarding housing reimbursement 
and PGV employee alarm system. 
PGV understands the rationale of this recommendation and agrees that any confusion 
referred to in Recommendation E should be minimized. PGV is reviewing its policies 
with respect to these matters and will work with the Hawaii County Planning 
Department to avoid similar confusion in the future. 
AA. Page 12, ·Recommendation F, PGV notification of hydrogen sulfide releases. 
PGV concurs, and has already completed the additional notifications. See PGV 
Response H. 
